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CUNDY v. LE COCQ.
Where a licensed persun was charged, under section 13 of the Licensing Act
1872, with having sold intoxicating liquor to a drunken person and convicted, but
it was proved that neither the licensed person nor his servants had noticed that the
person served was drunk, there being no apparent indications of intoxication, Held,
that the licensed person was properly couvicted, it being no defence to show that
neither the appellant nor his servants knew, or had the means of knowing, that the
person served was drunk.

stated under 20 & 21 Viet., c. 48.
At the West Ham Police Court on the 1st of February 1884,
the appellant was charged by the respondent, under section 13 of
the Licensing Act 1872, for that he, being the keeper of certain
licensed premises, had, on tbe 14th of January 1884, sold intoxicating liquor to a drunken person.
It was proved that there had been a sale of intoxicating liquor,
and' that the person served was drunk, but it was also proved, in
answering the complaint, that neither the appellant nor his servants
had noticed that the person served was drunk, and that the drunken
person, while in the licensed premises, had been quiet in this
demeanor, and had done nothing to indicate insobriety, the evidence
showing that there were no apparent indications of intoxication.
Upon the evidence, it was contended for the appellant, that there
was nothing to show any knowledge or means of knowledge, on the
part of the appellant or his servants, that the person served was
drunk.
The magistrate convicted the appellant, holding that the offence
was complete with proof that a sale had taken place, and that the
person served was drunk, and that it was unnecessary to determine
whether the appellant or his servants knew, or had the means of
kfiowing, that the person served was drunk, or could, with ordinary
care, have detected the drunkenness.
The question for the court was whether the decision was right.
Section 18 of 35 & 86 Vict., c.94, provides: "If any licensed
person permits drunkenness, or any violent, quarrelsome or riotous
conduct to take place on his premises, or sells any intoxicating
liquor to any drunken person, he shall be liable to a penalty," &c.
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R. S. Wright, for the respondent.
STEPHEN, J.-This conviction must be affirmed. -The case turns
upon the question whether the words of section 13, taken in consideration with the general scheme of the act, imply that the person
who sells the intoxicating liquor to a drunken person must know,
or have reasonable means of knowing, that the person served was
drunk, or whether the words amount to an absolute prohibition
against selling intoxicating liquor to a drunken person. I am of
opinion that the latter is the true construction, and that it is only
a ground for mitigation of punishment if the publican did not
know, or had not reasonable means of knowing, that the person
served.was drunk.
What chiefly leads me to this conclusion is that knowledge is
expressly made an element in some of the offences under this part
of the act and not in others. For instance, by section 14, knowingly permitting his premises to be the habitual resort of reputed
prostitutes; and, by section 16, knowingly harboring any constable. I believe that the object of omitting the word "knowingly," in this part of the section, was to throw upon thp landlord
the duty of finding out whether a person served is drunk or not,
and the effect of it is that, if a person served is drunk, the landlord
or his servants must find that out, or take the risk of serving such
a person.
But it has been urged that the old maxim of the criminal law,
that there must be a "guilty mind" in the accused person before
he can be convicted, applies. This maxim seems to have come
into use when the criminal law was in a very undefined state for
the guidance of those who administered that law. In some crimes
a guilty mind is a necessary ingredient, but those crimes have
now been defined, and so the old maxim has been superseded by
the precise definitions of most crime, and,. at the present day,
whether a guilty mind is a necessary ingredient in any particular
offence turns upon the words of each definition or of each statute.
That knowledge, or guilty mind, is not always a necessary ingredient was decided in .Reg. v. Prince; and the case of Beg. v.
Bishop is very much to the same effect. The object of this part
of the thirteenth section is to preclude all discussion as to whether
the publican or his servants knew, or might reasonably have known,
that the person served was drunk at the time, the publican taking
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the risk of the person's having been drunk upon himself.
conviction, was right.

This

MATHEW, J.-I am of the same opinion. The language of the
act is perfectly clear. I am satisfied that if Mr. Besley'8 construction were put upon this part of the section it would be rendered
useless. It is no hardship on the publican to have to find out
whether a man is drunk or not. I cannot help thinking that th6
word "knowingly" was purposely omitted. I quite agree with my
brother STEPHEN that this conviction must be affirmed.
Conviction affirmed.
Although guilty knowledge or guilty
intent is generally necessary in commonlaw offences, yet statutes often expressly
or inpliedly dispense with this element
and make certain acts penal, whether
done with guilty knowledge or not.
Thus in Massachusetts a statute declared positively that "whoever sells,
keeps, or offers for sale adulterated milk,"
shall be punished, &c., and under this
and similar statutes it has frequently
been held that the penalty was incurred
'without any knowledge of the adulteration, as where the seller had bought it for
pure milk of other parties: Commonwealth v. Faren,9 Allen 489; Com'th
v. Nichols, 10 Allen 199 ; Statev. Smith,
10 R. L 258.
A similar rule was applied in State v.
Hartfiel, 24 Wisc. 60, and Ulrich v. The
Commonwealth, 6 Bush 400, as sales to
minors of intoxicating liquors. See also
Barnes v. State, 19 Conn. 398 ; Beckham v. Nacke, 56 Mo. 546, for marrying
minors without the consent of their parents ; while had 1he word "1knowingly " been used the rule would be different: Commonwealth v. blannelly, 15 Gray
195 ; Commonwealthv . Boynton, 12 Cush.
499. And it is familiar law that the
statutes against selling intoxicating
liquor are violated, although the vendor
does not know it is intoxicating: Com'th
v. Boynton, 2 Allen 160; Com'th v.Goodlxan, 97 Mass. 117 ; Com'th.v. Halett,
103 Mass. 452. So if a statute against

selling veal declares, "whoever kills for
sale, any calf of four weeks old, shall be
punished," &c., it is not essential that
the defendant know the age of the calf:
Crommonwealth v. Rzaynnond, 97 Mass.
567. So of selling naphtha under some
other name, contrary to a statute, imposing a penalty upon "any person who
shall sell or keep for sale, naphtha, under
any .assumed name," the party may he
guilty, although he was not aware it was
naphtha, but thought it some other oil :
Commonwealth v. Wentworth, 118 Mass.
441. In a complaint against a billiard
saloon keeper for permitting a minor to
play, it is not necessary to show that he
knew him to be a minor, since the statute
says, "the keeper of a billiard saloon,
who admits a minor thereto, without the
written consent of his parent or guardian, shall forfeit $10, &c.": Commonwealth v. Emmons, 98 Mass. 6. On the
other hand some very respectable authorities adopt a different view.
Thus in Birney v. The State, 8 Ohio
230, the defendant was indicted for harboring and secreting a slave, under a
statute "that if any person shall harbor
or secrete any black or mulatto person,
the property of another, the person so
offending shall be fined, &c."
No
knowledge or guilty intent is made necessary by the statute, and the court
held that knowledge should have been
averred in the indictment and proved on
the trial, the court saying: " We know

